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On Demographic and Democratic Transitions
Tim Dyson this essay considers the implications of the demographic transition for the emergence of modern democracy. although the idea of representative democracy was present in europe and north america in the late eighteenth century, here i am concerned with its realization-and this occurs much later. i argue that consideration of the demographic transition in western countries sheds light on what is sometimes called the "democratic transition." indeed, i believe that few aspects of socioeconomic development were more closely associated with the appearance of democracy than was progress with respect to the demographic transition.
the relationship between the demographic and democratic transitions has been largely overlooked. one recalls Paul demeny's still highly apposite observation-made in a paper now almost half a century old-regarding the extraordinary degree of neglect, shown by historians and other social scientists, of the consequences of the demographic transition. also germane are his remark that study of history can provide valuable insight into forces that are still at work, and his reflection on the non-autochthonous character of many of the development processes that are affecting developing countries (see demeny 1968: 502-504) .
after providing background on previous research, the essay 1) discusses why a population's progress through the demographic transition might be expected to promote a movement to democratic politics; 2) considers issues of measurement in relation to both the demographic transition and democracy; 3) examines the emergence of democracy with particular reference to europe; and 4) appraises the potential relevance of my argument to contemporary international conditions. Background accounting for the emergence of democracy is a central concern of political science. much research on the subject reflects arguments articulated several ©2013 the Population Council, inc. decades ago by Seymour martin lipset. He argued that economic development, including various factors it subsumes-especially the attainment of higher incomes, but also industrialization, urbanization, and the spread of education-is the most important general force behind the transition to democratic politics (lipset 1960) .
of course, many non-economic considerations, such as the nature of pre-existing political institutions, cultural orientation, and the degree of social homogeneity, can also affect the position of countries with respect to democracy. and there has been much debate about the ways in which economic development may promote democratization. thus lipset saw the growth of an educated middle class as being crucial, whereas rueschemeyer and colleagues (1992) stressed the role played by an expanding urban working class. Some analysts have questioned whether economic growth assists democratization (e.g., londregan and Poole 1996; acemoglu et al. 2008 ). indeed, research using similar data and methods sometimes comes to different conclusions on the issue (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; epstein et al. 2006) . nevertheless, most quantitative studies conclude that economic development-as reflected, in particular, by higher incomes, but also by higher levels of non-agricultural employment and education-tends to promote democracy (e.g., Barro 1999; Feng and Zak 1999) . in this respect they concur with a large body of more qualitative work that identifies economic growth and processes like urbanization and industrialization as being important (e.g., moore 1967; dahl 1989) .
in contrast, little research has been done on the relationship between the demographic and democratic transitions. most work relevant to the subject deals with contemporary conditions and is framed not in terms of the factors that promote democracy, but in terms of factors that threaten socio-political stability. research in this vein argues that rapid growth in the number of young adults can raise difficulties related to employment opportunities, and therefore social stability (e.g., weiner and russell 2001; weber 2012) . while this work focuses on rapid growth in the number of young men, it also highlights the role of young age structures in weakening the basis for political order. thus, Cincotta argues that the prospects for democracy tend to rise as the proportion of young adults in the working-age population falls. He suggests that this is because support for autocratic rule among a country's elitewith the aim of avoiding instability-is likely to diminish as the proportion of young adults falls. in addition, he argues that improved economic conditions resulting from changes in age structure may also promote democracy (Cincotta 2008; 2008/09) .
Theoretical considerations
the theoretical considerations informing the present essay are consistent with the view that the young age structures and rapid population growth rates experienced by many countries in recent decades have been-and often still are-inimical to democracy. However, here i am mainly concerned with the emergence of democracy, rather than with its retardation. and i am also interested in considerations additional to those arising from young age structures and rapid population growth.
the case for why progress through the demographic transition might be expected to promote democratization is best summarized against the background of the transition's common stylized depiction, in which mortality decline occurs first-producing population growth-and fertility decline follows, which leads to both a falling rate of population growth and population aging. the start of fertility decline marks the onset of what might be termed the second half of this transition. the following discussion addresses these demographic processes in turn. it does so from the standpoint that, before the demographic transition, all political systems were mainly autocratic. no pre-transitional society was democratic in the sense in which the word is used here.
it is difficult to conceive of the emergence and consolidation of democracy in circumstances where life expectancy is very low. if, as some maintain (e.g., lipset 1960), release from poverty facilitates intelligent political engagement, then so, surely, does release from disease and sudden and early death. mortality decline tends to encourage an increase in the level of savings and investment in society, an outcome that is likely to reflect an increasing concern with the future (Bloom and Canning 2001) . improved health may also mean that greater thought is given to matters of justice and social equity. and a healthier citizenry may be more capable of questioning autocratic rule. it is true that the influence of life expectancy on democracy is sometimes hard to demonstrate using contemporary data (Barro 1999) . But this may be partly because mortality decline has been so pervasive. moreover, its implications for democratization may be greater at lower life expectancies than at higher ones. while mortality decline does not guarantee democracy, some degree of decline has invariably preceded the establishment of democracy.
Population growth can test the management capacities of any statefor example, in administration, taxation, and the maintenance of social order (Goldstone 2003) . the rise in the rate of natural increase resulting from mortality decline represents a long period of demographic de-stabilization. this raises challenges for existing political systems, all of which at this stage are essentially autocratic. when fertility decline begins and the rate of natural increase falls, however, these challenges are likely to be reduced. although the closing of the period of de-stabilization does not ensure that democracy is established, the conditions for this to happen are likely to be improved if other processes are also working in this direction. For instance, the basis for establishing a consensus for rule by elected representatives in proportion to the numbers of people is likely to be facilitated by slower population growth.
Fertility decline causes the fall in the rate of natural increase and leads to population aging. But it also reflects and contributes to a transformation in the lives of women and men. illustrative calculations suggest that in europe and the united States in the late eighteenth century, women might spend 70 percent of their adulthood bearing and rearing children. in these societies today the figure is about 15 percent (lee 2003). Fertility decline has underlain the increasing movement of women out of the domestic domain into formal employment and their growing independence vis-à-vis men (davis and van den oever 1982). in this context, it is often suggested that increased female employment stoked the demand for, and realization of, the female franchise: in western countries, voting rights were commonly extended to women after they had been given to men (ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997) . with few exceptions, women only began to gain equal voting rights in the 1920s and 1930s.
1 Significantly, this was when conditions of low fertility were first achieved.
initially in the demographic transition, falling child mortality usually means that populations become slightly younger. moreover, lower child mortality often introduces a lag between the onset of fertility decline and the onset of population aging. nevertheless, once underway the process of population aging involves a long-term reduction in the proportion of children and adolescents in society and a corresponding rise in the proportion of people in the main working ages. Perhaps because it is relatively slow, the possible contribution of this development to the widening distribution of political power in society has scarcely been considered. Yet the present idea linking aging with democratization is simple: adults are more likely to want a voice in political affairs, and, with greater proportional numbers, they have greater capacity to achieve this goal. it seems reasonable to suggest that the redistribution of political power away from ruling elites and toward the middle and working classes in europe and the united States occurred partly because these classes became increasingly adult in their age composition. Finally, although urbanization is often viewed as resulting from economic growth, there are reasons to regard it as mainly the outcome of demographic transition (dyson 2011). while urbanization is frequently seen as supporting democratization (e.g., moore 1967; acemoglu and robinson 2001), some scholars note that towns with growing numbers of poor people can be very receptive to autocratic rule (e.g., Huntington 1968) . research using contemporary data does not uniformly conclude that urbanization promotes democratization (e.g., epstein et al. 2006) . Here one should recall that the urban growth rates experienced by modern developing countries are higher than those experienced by developed countries in the past. moreover, the fact that political activity is usually centered in urban areas does not necessarily mean that urbanization itself promotes democracy. in summary, there are reasons to think that, in the long run and in underlying ways, most of the aforementioned demographic processes promote democratization. in particular, population growth may raise challenges for political regimes that initially are largely autocratic. then, in the second half of the demographic transition, fertility decline-which helps to empower women-and consequent population aging both seem likely to fuel demand for a more equal distribution of political power. moreover, the slowing of population growth should increase the chances for socio-political stability, which may also benefit democratization.
Issues of measurement
in what follows, i use a population's median age (ma) to gauge its progress in the demographic transition. i considered alternative measures for this purpose (e.g., life expectancy), but none performed as well. the estimates of median age come from united nations (1956, 2011) sources and are based on census data. while a population's age structure may have an independent effect on its chance of being a democracy, i make no attempt to gauge this here. instead, median age is regarded as a composite measure of overall demographic progress. thus in international cross-section (and over time), median age is strongly and positively associated with life expectancy and urbanization. and, because of the direct causal connection from fertility decline and slowing natural increase to population aging, median age is negatively and even more strongly associated with total fertility and the rate of natural increase. 3 while my chief concern here is with historical experience in europe, the analysis also draws on data for the 151 countries (35 in europe) that, according to the united nations, contained more than one million people in 2005. the average median age of the ten youngest countries in that year was 16.3 years. the corresponding life expectancy and total fertility figures were 50.4 years and 6.7 births. the average annual rate of natural increase was 3.1 percent, and an average of 26 percent of people lived in urban areas. in contrast, the average median age of the ten oldest countries was 40.9 years. the life expectancy and total fertility figures were 78.2 years and 1.4 births. the rate of natural increase was -0.05 percent, and 72 percent lived in urban areas. these statistics summarize contemporary variation with respect to the second half of the demographic transition. a country where the median age is 16 is only on the brink of fertility decline, whereas one where it is 40 has reached the end of the transition.
it is relatively straightforward to gauge a country's status with respect to the demographic transition. But assessing its position with respect to democracy is more problematic-not least, because democracy itself is a difficult concept (inkeles 1991). Furthermore, i need a measure of democracy that is available for the past as well as for more recent times. in this context, two datasets provide national measures of democracy from the nineteenth century onward-those of vanhanen (2000, 2003, 2009 ) and the Polity iv project (e.g., marshall and Jaggers 2009). Both datasets were used here, and they both support my general argument. 4 However, the results presented here derive from vanhanen's index of democratization (id). this dataset is preferred as being more objective.
vanhanen's index of democratization is the product of two variables. the first, C, measures the extent to which political competition occurs in society. this is reflected by the proportion of electoral votes that goes to parties other than the largest one. the second, P, measures the degree to which there is political participation. this is indicated mainly by voter turnout, expressed as a proportion of the population, although allowance is also made for the taking of referendums (vanhanen 2003: 59-63) . the upper limit of both proportions is restricted at 0.7. therefore the value of id ( = C * P * 100) ranges between zero and a theoretical-and unattained-maximum of 49. to illustrate using the 2010 united Kingdom election results: 29.69 million votes were cast (10.73 million for the largest party) in a country of 62.04 million people (BBC news 2010). therefore, id = 30.6 (i.e., 0.639 * 0.479 * 100).
id is a minimalist measure. among other reasons, it has been criticized because 1) it neglects the degree to which government offices are actually filled by elections and 2) it may be biased where party systems are highly fragmented (munck and verkuilen 2002; Gates et al. 2006 ). However, id also has a number of strengths. thus, in contrast to most other democracy measures, it is relatively free of subjective evaluation. it is also fairly straightforward and is transparent in terms of the data on which it is based. it is a continuous rather than an ordinal scale, and it reflects the extent to which people actually vote in elections. in particular, it values the votes of women equally to those of men (Paxton 2000) . 5 thus, importantly, if the franchise is extended to women, the value of id can potentially double (other things being equal). However, perhaps its greatest strength is that id attempts to capture what many see as democracy's two key dimensions: the competitiveness of elections and the extent to which people vote (dahl 1989) .
nevertheless, a problem with id is that participation, P, is calculated with reference to the total rather than the adult population. therefore, for any given level of voter turnout, id will be biased downward in a society with a young age structure. this problem is acknowledged to exaggerate differences between countries (vanhanen 2000: 255), but it does not seem to have been addressed in previous research. Consider, for example, that in 2005 in the ten youngest of the 151 countries, the average proportion of the population aged 20 years and over-taken here to represent those of voting age-was just 42.0 percent, whereas in the ten oldest countries it was 79.5 percent. Fortunately, however, the problem can be remedied. For the 151 countries, united nations (2011) data reveal a stable and tight relationship between the proportion of a population that is aged 20 years and over, y, and ma.
6 it is: y = 0.4097ln(ma) -0.7255 (r 2 = 0.991). therefore, given ma, the value of id can be divided by an estimate of the proportion of the population aged 20 years and over to give an age-adjusted index of democratization (aid). For the uK in 2010, the united nations puts ma at 39.8 years-which, using the equation, implies that 78.4 percent of the population was aged 20 and over. therefore, aid = 39.0 (i.e., 30.6/0.784).
in what follows, the main focus is on the relationship between aid and ma. therefore, it is important to stress that the adjustment of id to produce aid makes the task of establishing a positive relationship with ma more difficult. this is because, using id, in a young population (low ma) there will be relatively few potential voters, whereas in an old population (high ma) there will be many more.
Finally, some remarks are required regarding the other measures used in the historical analysis below. Clearly, the extent to which socioeconomic measures could be included depended on their availability, and it proved difficult to obtain consistent estimates of urbanization. all estimates of real per capita GdP were taken from maddison (2009). For european countries, the estimates of the percentage of the economically active population employed in agriculture (forestry and fishing) were calculated from data in mitchell (2007); and estimates of the average number of years of schooling attained by people aged 15 years and over were taken from morrisson and murtin (2009). For the united States, estimates of the percentage of the population living in urban areas come mainly from the uS Census Bureau (2008); estimates of the percentage of the labor force working in agriculture were calculated from mitchell (1983), updated using statistics in Carter et al. (2006) . lastly, the education measure used for the uS is the high school graduation rate; a series for 1870-1995 is also provided by Carter et al. (2006) .
Historical experience
according to vanhanen's dataset, there was virtually no democracy anywhere in the world during the first half of the nineteenth century. in europe, this was a period of demographic de-stabilization-one overshadowed by the French revolution. autocratic elites clung to power, and what political progress occurred was extremely limited (Ziblatt 2006) . thus in 1850 only two countries had id values much above zero: France (7.4)-briefly, following the uprising of 1848-and the united States (6.8). accordingly, table 1 presents estimates of aid and ma for europe and the united States starting in 1850.
the aid values in table 1 are presented along with the id values from which they are derived. For europe, the table also indicates the number of countries used to obtain the id values on a population-weighted basis. as one would expect, in the early decades after 1850-when the populations of europe and the united States were young-the calculation of aid involves a large upward adjustment of id in proportional terms. the scale of the adjustment then declines as the populations get older. note too that the median age of europe's population may have been falling in the late nineteenth century, before starting its long-run rise after 1890. For both europe and the united States, the strength of the association between ma and aid declines as aid is increasingly lagged on ma-that is, the correlation is strongest with no lag.
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Considering the emergence of democracy in europe, the aid values in table 1 indicate an initial rise between about 1890 and 1930. of course, the abrupt fall in the aid value for 1940 reflects the appearance of fascist regimes. after world war ii, there is a (more than) full recovery by 1950, relative stability in the period to 1985, and a further sharp rise between 1985 and 1995-reflecting the collapse of the Soviet union. lastly, the aid value falls slightly after 1995, mainly the result of adverse events in russia. it is worth noting that although europe experienced considerable economic growth and socioeconomic development between 1950 and 1985, there was little change in the level of democracy: essentially, political progress was "frozen" by the Cold war.
the aid values for the united States suggest that the level of democracy has always been higher than in europe. However, one should recall that the emergence of democracy in the uS was closely related to the experience of countries in northwestern europe, rather than to that of europe as a whole. the aid values for the united States suggest that, again, the period between about 1890 and 1930 was particularly significant. indeed, the value of aid almost doubles between 1900 and 1910.
8 it is noteworthy that, with some fluctuation, the level of democracy then remains fairly unchanged for much of the twentieth century. the modest upward shift in democracy seen after 1990 partly reflects the influence of the increased holding of state referendums in the calculation of id. table 2 summarizes the results from multiple regression analysis of the trends in aid shown in table 1. For europe, it was only possible to compile additional time series for per capita income. However, as noted, series for the united States can also be assembled for urbanization, employment in agriculture, and education. the difficulties of drawing firm conclusions in circumstances where all variables are moving in one general direction should require no emphasis here. nevertheless, in both cases ma performs relatively well.
the rise of democracy in europe during the "democratic age" of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is of particular interest. exactly when the rise began is hard to say, but it was definitely underway from 1890 (see table 1 ). Comparison of the id values for 1890 and 1930 for the 18 european countries for which estimates for both years are available re-veals that the rise was almost entirely attributable to substantial advances in eight countries, mostly in northwestern europe. these countries are austria, Belgium, denmark, Germany, netherlands, norway, Sweden, and the uK. more limited progress occurred in France, Greece, and Switzerland. on the other hand, id remained close to zero in the remaining countries, which are mostly in southern and eastern europe. 9 in this context, it is notable that the onset of fertility decline in northwestern europe often occurred in the 1870s and 1880s-that is, somewhat earlier than elsewhere (demeny 1968; Chesnais 2001 Figure 1 plots the relationship between the changes in ma and aid. the relationship is posi- Carter et al. (2006) . the high school graduation rate is secondary school graduates as a percentage of 17-year-olds, and is also from Carter et al. (2006) . (2009). See text for the procedure used to derive aid. ma values were estimated using census age data in united nations (1956) . the age data provided for austria for 1910 and earlier years clearly relate to austria-Hungary; therefore age data for austria available at «http://sdb.statistik.at/» were employed to estimate ma for these years. interpolation was sometimes used to obtain estimates of ma for the exact years shown. Table 3 . 0 tive and significant (p = 0.049). in general, countries that experienced larger increases in ma became appreciably more democratic. the geographical dimension of Figure 1 is noteworthy. thus denmark, norway, and Sweden form a Scandinavian cluster that underwent similar changes. also, Greece, italy, and Portugal-together with France-can be seen as comprising a "southern" cluster that experienced relatively minor changes in ma and aid. Perhaps the most notable outlier is the netherlands, which had become the most democratic country by 1930. the netherlands experienced a major rise in aid, even though, with somewhat higher fertility than most neighboring countries, its median age increased by just 2.4 years. it is possible that political developments elsewhere in northwestern europe influenced democratization in the netherlands despite the country's slower demographic progress. For 11 of the countries in table 3 it is also possible to assemble estimates of per capita income, employment in agriculture, and the average number of years of schooling attained by the population aged 15 years and over, for the period 1890-1930. 10 table 4 summarizes the results obtained when these variables are included in the analysis, both for the period as a whole and on a pooled basis when decadal data are considered. again, changes in ma are most closely associated with changes in aid (in the pooled analysis, p = 0.043). Comparison of the time paths of aid and ma for individual countries reveals interesting variation. while, as one would expect, the median ages of populations increase relatively smoothly, the progress of aid is more variable-for example, reflecting legislative change on voting rights. France is a notable case. the country's population was perhaps the oldest in europe during 1890-1930, but its level of democracy, as indicated by aid, while increasing, remained relatively low (see table 3). the main reason was that French women could not vote until 1945. Similarly, female suffrage in Belgium was not attained until 1948, and the modest rise in aid for Switzerland again reflects the late extension of voting rights to women.
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12 these cases illustrate that while demographic progress, as summarized by ma, is fairly regular, changes in the rules that govern political participation (and competition) can be both delayed and abrupt. among other factors, legislative change is the outcome of struggles between different interest groups, and it is also influenced by the nature of pre-existing institutions. therefore, one might expect to find evidence of "stickiness" between demographic change on the one hand and the emergence of democracy on the other.
For a few countries, however, it is clear that increases in aid occurred ahead of increases in ma. the case of netherlands has been noted, although the explanation at least partly reflects the country's comparatively late fertility decline. But the experience of denmark and norway was different. their time paths of ma are not unusual, but their rises in aid clearly began somewhat earlier. this is especially clear for norway. one might suggest that the country's struggle for independence from Sweden may have facilitated its early realization of democracy. of course, a key aspect of this phenomenon was the gaining of votes for women, which occurred in 1913. as in australia and new Zealand-the first countries to introduce female suffrage-it appears that the creation of political institutions to some extent de novo in norway meant that problems of institutional stickiness were easier to overcome. 13 lastly, using estimates from Chesnais (2001) , i can also examine trends in fertility for a few of the countries in table 3. For illustration, Figure 2 compares changes in total fertility, ma, and aid in Germany between 1871 and 1940. to facilitate comparison, the fertility, ma, and aid series have been indexed between zero (the lowest value) and 100 (the highest value), with the index for fertility reversed (i.e., an increasing index signifies falling fertility). as one would expect, fertility decline in Germany preceded the rise in ma, the delay reflecting the offsetting effect on age structure of declines in child mortality. notice that ma and aid rose together (i.e., with no lag), before democracy collapsed in the 1930s. the experience of other countries exhibits some variation in the timing of the rise in aid relative to changes in both fertility and ma. thus, and exceptionally, in norway fertility decline and the rise in aid occurred more or less simultaneously-and well before the rise in ma. on the other hand, the experience of Sweden and the uK was more akin to that of Germany, with ma and aid rising at about the same time. Finally, for reasons already noted, the attainment of high aid values for France and Switzerland was delayed even longer compared to these demographic changes. in summary, it appears that fertility decline almost always preceded the rise in aid. moreover, in several cases ma and aid rose broadly together, although the concurrence shown in Figure 2 for Germany is exceptional. returning to theoretical considerations, one could clearly develop an additional argument that fertility decline reflects an increase in human agency and that, other things equal, it is this same increase in agency that, with varying lags, eventually makes itself evident in the political domain.
International variation
the main concern of this essay is with historical trends. But analysis of contemporary cross-national data has supported the conclusion of a close as- (Ziblatt 2006) . therefore, it is worth briefly considering the recent international relationship between ma and aid. many factors affect the status of countries with respect to democracy in the modern world. and, partly as a result of pressure from western countries, the process of democratization often reflects foreign influences. in this context, the aid values for 2005 for some countries with very young populations-such as malawi (39.7) and mauritania (45.8)-compare favorably with those of long-established democracies with older populations-such as Canada (34.5) and the uK (38.2). Such considerations illustrate the limitations, perhaps especially in modern circumstances, of aid as an indicator of democracy having become consolidated in a given country. a high aid value does not necessarily mean that democracy is secure.
nevertheless, in what follows the focus remains on aid and on the relative importance of key socioeconomic variables that are thought to promote democracy. the period considered begins in 1980, partly because of the paucity of employment and education estimates for earlier decades. moreover, for most of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s vanhanen's dataset contains id values for relatively few countries, chiefly because it excludes populations then under colonial rule.
From 1980 onward, however, it is possible to assemble a relatively comprehensive set of estimates relating to aid, ma, per capita GdP, urbanization, employment, and education. Given what is sometimes claimed regarding the influence of urbanization on democratization, the inclusion of united nations (2010) urbanization estimates should be noted. estimates of the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture are taken from the international labor organization (2008) . estimates of the percentage of the population aged 20 years and over having at least secondary school education are from lutz and colleagues (lutz, Goujon, and Sanderson 2007) .
with this as background, table 5 summarizes the results from crosssectional regressions relating to 1980-2005. For each point in time, the analysis was conducted for the 151 countries for which estimates of all of the measures could be assembled.
14 the regressions were run both with and without median age. notice that without ma, per capita income is statistically significant at each point in time. But when ma is introduced, the strength of the association between aid and income weakens considerably, and disappears for 1990 and 2005. there is no consistent indication that a country's level of urbanization, employment structure, and level of education are associated with its position with respect to democracy. in contrast, the relationship between ma and aid is statistically significant throughout. these results tentatively suggest that a country's status with respect to the demographic transition may still exert an influence on whether it is a democracy.
Discussion
this essay has proposed that progress in the demographic transition is a significant factor in the process of democratization. drawing on experience in europe and the united States, i have suggested that demographic and democratic developments were associated with each other in the past and that they probably remain so today. Historical research can shed light on factors that help determine whether new democracies will succeed.
Some degree of mortality decline is almost certainly required for stable democratic conditions. However, through the population growth that it generates, mortality decline raises challenges for pre-existing-autocraticregimes. Fertility decline is crucial here. it causes population aging, brings about major alterations in the lives of women, and produces a fall in the rate of natural increase-gradually enhancing the conditions required for sociopolitical stability. median age is a good measure of cumulative demographic progress in most of these respects. it is difficult to regard any country with a low median age as being firmly democratic. demographic and democratic gains can both be viewed as reflecting and representing advances in human agency. much of the present argument has been that as the structure of a society becomes increasingly composed of adult men and women, autocratic political structures are likely to be increasingly challenged and replaced by more democratic ones. Here demographic processes work in remote (i.e., underlying) ways. debating whether the middle or the working class is the vehicle of change is a secondary matter. i should underscore that this essay has been concerned with factors that contribute to the establishment of stable democracies. in this context, research on contemporary cross-national data suggests that countries that have recently become democratic are much more likely to regress if their age structures are young (weber 2012)-like malawi and mauritania, for example. i would also emphasize that the present results do not rule out the beneficial influence of other socioeconomic variables on democratization. thus, using age-specific estimates of educational attainment, work by lutz and colleagues on recent data also finds that declines in youth dependency are favorable for democracy, but suggests that improvements in education may be even more important (lutz, Cuaresma, and abbasi-Shavazi 2010) .
16 these authors too doubt whether per capita income has a significant influence on democracy. indeed, there is growing evidence that demographic transition is at least as beneficial for democratization as is economic growth.
of course, demographic and socioeconomic factors are not the only influences on democratization. Historical and geographical considerations can be very important. moreover, political developments frequently have a powerful-and sometimes adverse-dynamic of their own. while i have not addressed such factors here, they often explain the variable progress of countries in their demographic and democratic transitions. india and Cuba provide examples. democracy in india advanced somewhat ahead of demography. india's first general elections were held in 1951-52, when the country's median age was only about 20 years. However, external influences were significant in the establishment of democracy in india. one should also recall that parliamentary rule was suspended during 1975-77: democracy was fragile. the fact that india's median age currently exceeds 25 and is rising surely signifies a strengthening basis for democratic politics. By contrast, Cuba is an example where, for political reasons, there has been no real prospect of democracy for decades, despite substantial demographic advance (median age is about 38). nevertheless, the demographic basis for democracy clearly exists in Cuba, and it may take only a seemingly small event, such as the departure of a few national leaders, to trigger significant democratic change.
it is important to acknowledge, therefore, that progress in the demographic transition does not guarantee the transition to democracy-even on time scales that can stretch for many decades. in particular, political processes can intervene. one has only to think of the rise of fascism in europe in the 1930s, the influence of the Cold war, or the continuing legacy of Communism in countries like China, Cuba, and russia. nevertheless, if the argument has force, it should bode well for democracy. in recent decades many countries, poor as well as middle income, have experienced fertility decline and begun to age. Such changes are likely to help foster the emergence of stable democratic systems.
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1 of 125 countries, only new Zealand (1893), australia (1902 ( ), Finland (1906 , and norway (1913) had the female franchise before 1915 (Paxton 2000) . as rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992: 140) remark, new Zealand benefited from earlier franchise struggles in Britain and was "virtually 'born free.'" 2 indeed, because scholars often attribute democratization to growth of the middle or working classes, it might be said that population aging is-albeit unconsciously-implicit in their argument insofar as aging contributes to growth of the adult membership of both classes.
